The Long Shadow of Corruption | Part II | More Lessons From the Past - Empires of India & Rome.

Welcome back to this look at ancient examples of corruption and anticorruption - somehow comforting and disturbing all at once. Humanity has recognised that corrupt behaviour is not in the best interests of society, but of course we take the big picture into account while not addressing it directly. That is, that these civilisations were not modern democracies, they were not just and fair in the sense that we understand it, though they understood the damage that various types of corruption could do. And actually, depending on local culture and religion some of the ideas seem more progressive and relevant to today's global landscape.

A little different from the previous article, today we will focus on two megalodons of ancient history and governance. India and Italy in the form of the Maurya(n) and Roman Empires. The latter will be more familiar to many, but the former is no slouch. These are both sophisticated and long-lasting regimes that changed in scope and dimension over hundreds of years. We don't have a modern equivalent as things have changed to such a degree (though Russia isn't far off from being an century long omnishambles), but we can posit that these rules, laws and guides - alongside the adjustment of approach in relation to types of governance and corruption - were a key way to maintain and manage vast dominions and subjects.

There are similarities and differences of course, the idea is to look at certain instances or approaches to anti-corruption within these systems. The geographical range of the Roman Empire gives it different issues in the corruption dynamic as discussed here. Size wise though, the Maurya Empire was one of the largest empires in ancient history, stretching across much of what is now India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan.

I think there is an expectation, a rational one, of ancient empires being more susceptible or accepting of corruption. They were after all emperors, conquerers and warlords. We might expect a less structured moral dynamic when framed in that way. However, as we saw in the the previous article, this wasn't the case in Egypt, Babylonia, Greece or China - now let's see how these two might empires fair.

You can buy a copy, it won't be a first edition though // src: Amazon / Fingerprint! Publishing

INDIA (c. 300 BCE ≈ 2,325 years ago / final compilation 2,175 years ago)

Kautilya’s Arthashastra

Background of the Time

We're headed to Mauryan India, but side-note, the Arthashastra wasn't deemed complete until around 150 BCE. The Maurya empire was first forged by Chandragupta Maurya (reigned c. 321–297 BCE) after toppling the Nanda dynasty. His success owed much to his chief adviser and strategist, Kautilya - also known as Chanakya or Vishnugupta - a scholar from Takshashila (aka Taxila - a city and now UNESCO World Heritage Site on the Pothohar Plateau of Punjab, Pakistan) who combined political cunning with administrative genius.

By the time the Arthashastra (“Science of Wealth/Statecraft”) was compiled - most scholars place its final redaction around the 2nd century BCE - the Mauryan state had become a sprawling, hierarchical bureaucracy. Provincial governors managed revenue and justice; networks of officials collected taxes and oversaw trade; and spies reported back to the capital at Pataliputra (aka Patna, the capital of the state of Bihar, northeast India). This was one of the world’s first attempts at centralised civil administration - and, inevitably, a breeding ground for corruption.

Unlike Ashoka’s later moral reformism, Kautilya’s project was born of realpolitik (practical rather than moral ideas). His goal was not to make men virtuous, but to make the state survive. He assumed humans were self-interested and corruptible, and therefore built a system designed to outsmart them.

Types of Corruption and How They Manifested

Kautilya’s treatment of corruption is astonishingly detailed. In Book II, Chapter 8, he lists forty ways of embezzlement, ranging from inflating expenses to falsifying receipts - arguably the earliest written typology of financial crime.

He identifies several key (and familiar) patterns:

• Misappropriation of funds: “What is taken for oneself under the guise of expenditure.”

• Falsified accounts: Manipulating ledgers to hide theft or shift blame.

• Collusion and kickbacks: Two or more officials sharing illicit gains.

• Extortion: Tax collectors squeezing merchants or peasants beyond lawful rates.

• Favouritism and nepotism: Promoting kin or allies rather than the competent.

Crucially, Kautilya never pretends that corruption can be eliminated—it can only be detected and deterred. He compares dishonest officials to fish in water: “One cannot tell when they drink.”

To control this inevitability, he prescribes an entire framework of anti-corruption mechanisms:

• Auditing: Regular inspections by independent officers.

• Surveillance: Spies posing as merchants, ascetics, or servants to observe officials.

• Rotation of duties: Preventing local power networks from forming.

• Punitive deterrence: Severe penalties for fraud, scaled to rank and amount stolen.

• Rewarding informants: Encouraging whistle-blowing through monetary incentives.

This is bureaucracy as counter-corruption architecture is designed less to inspire virtue than to make vice unprofitable.

Impact and Response

The Arthashastra reveals a state obsessed with information, control, and accountability. Kautilya envisioned a ruler who ruled through systems, not sentiment: a monarch both feared and respected because his government worked efficiently and could not easily be deceived.

His model helped consolidate the Mauryan Empire, which required the management of vast resources, military logistics, and trade networks. For centuries afterward, Indian political thought would return to Kautilya as a realist counterpart to the moral idealism of Buddhist or Jain kingship.

Yet the Arthashastra is not entirely devoid of ethics. Kautilya insists that the ruler’s ultimate duty is raksha - the protection of the people - and that good governance must produce yogakshema, welfare and security. The text’s cold pragmatism is tempered by a kind of utilitarian morality: the prosperity of the realm justifies strict discipline. In that sense, Kautilya’s anti-corruption philosophy sits halfway between moral governance and surveillance statecraft, a balance modern bureaucracies still wrestle with.

Yea it's not related I know - but it's just a great shot of the Taj Mahal! // src: Unsplash

INDIA (c. 260 BCE ≈ 2,285 years ago)

The Edicts of Ashoka

Background of the Time

We’re in 3rd century BCE India, during the reign of Emperor Ashoka the Great (reigned c. 268–232 BCE) of the Maurya Empire, as you may know it was one of the largest and most sophisticated political entities of the ancient world. It had already united most of the Indian subcontinent under a centralised state with a professional bureaucracy, a standing army, and a complex taxation system.

Ashoka inherited a vast empire stretching from Afghanistan to Bengal - but it was a kingdom built on conquest. Early in his reign, Ashoka waged the Kalinga War (c. 261 BCE), a brutal campaign said to have killed over 100,000 people. The aftermath transformed him. Historical and inscriptional records show that the devastation led Ashoka to embrace Buddhism and embark on a moral and administrative reform programme rooted in Dhamma - a Sanskrit and Pali term meaning law, moral order, or righteous conduct.

The shift from a warrior-king to a philosopher-ruler wasn’t just spiritual; it was deeply political. Ashoka realised that sustaining a vast empire required not fear and punishment alone, but a shared sense of justice and morality - a way to govern fairly, reduce abuse, and create loyalty through ethics rather than terror.

Types of Corruption and How They Manifested

The Edicts of Ashoka are carved on rock faces and stone pillars across the empire in multiple languages (Prakrit, Greek, Aramaic), they reveal a ruler deeply concerned with the abuse of administrative power. Corruption, in the Mauryan context, was systemic:

• Bureaucratic exploitation: Local governors and tax collectors often enriched themselves through bribes or extortion, especially in distant provinces.

• Judicial bias: Officials dispensed justice unevenly, favouring the wealthy or politically connected.

• Neglect of duty: Regional officers, known as rajjukas, were notorious for laziness or cruelty toward the poor.

• Religious manipulation: Some clergy and Brahmins misused influence to secure privileges and donations under false moral pretences.

Ashoka’s response was to fuse morality and administration. His Major Rock Edict No. 5 explicitly outlines the creation of a new class of inspectors - Dhamma Mahamatras - tasked with overseeing officials, resolving local disputes, and ensuring humane governance. Their role was not just bureaucratic but ethical: they were to “see that no one suffers unjustly,” including prisoners, slaves, and animals.

In other edicts, he warns officials against arrogance, corruption, and neglect. Pillar Edict VII, for instance, urges that judgments must be given with “gentleness and patience,” not anger or bias. By promoting Dhamma as a state principle, Ashoka tried to moralise governance — to make integrity part of the administrative code itself.

Impact and Response

The effect of Ashoka’s reforms was transformative, at least ideologically. He redirected royal energy from conquest to conscience — calling it “the conquest by Dhamma.” Instead of boasting of victories, his inscriptions speak of remorse, self-discipline, and the welfare of his subjects.

Practically, his anti-corruption measures helped standardise administration across a multiethnic, multilingual empire. The Dhamma Mahamatras functioned much like an early civil service inspectorate, ensuring accountability from local officers to the central government. His system also introduced transparency by communication: edicts were placed in public spaces, effectively turning moral governance into state propaganda visible to all.

However, there were limits. After Ashoka’s death, later rulers struggled to maintain his moral administration without his personal authority. The Mauryan Empire eventually weakened, suggesting that Ashoka’s reforms were more dependent on the character of the ruler than on the permanence of the system - a recurring problem in anti-corruption history.

Still, his reign remains a striking early example of political ethics institutionalised - a leader who realised that legitimacy rests not just on power, but on moral credibility.

In a cashew nutshell.

Kautilya, the political strategist who helped Chandragupta Maurya (Ashoka’s grandfather) found the Mauryan Empire, wrote the Arthashastra - a massive treatise on governance, economics, and security. Kautilya’s Arthashastra is based on the core idea of a practical surveillance state, and controlling corruption through systems, fear, and intelligence.

Ashoka’s Edicts were based around ethical-administrative reform. With the idea of moralising power at its core. Ashoka’s approach was built on repentance and reform. After witnessing the horror of war, he reimagined kingship as a moral duty rather than divine privilege. His Edicts are an early experiment in ethical statecraft - an attempt to replace the corruption of cruelty, greed, and injustice with compassion, restraint, and accountability.

Where Ashoka’s inscriptions preach moral governance, Kautilya’s manual reads like an ancient anti-corruption handbook. While no direct ideological connection is provable, the structural influence and cultural proximity is extremely strong - Ashoka inherited the administrative state that Kautilya created and moved it toward moral governance. It's troubling and intriguing how little things have changed, but I suppose in the long run, 2000 years isn't much.

Aspect	Kautilya’s Arthashastra	Ashoka’s Edicts
Period	c. 300 BCE (compiled later)	c. 260 BCE
Approach	Administrative / systemic control	Ethical / moral reform
Motivation	Pragmatic governance, political survival	Personal transformation after war
Nature of corruption	Financial fraud, embezzlement, bribery	Abuse of power, injustice, cruelty
Anti-corruption mechanism	Audits, spies, deterrence	Moral inspectors (Dhamma Mahamatras)
Underlying philosophy	Political realism (Artha — material power)	Buddhist ethics (Dhamma)
Tone	Cynical and technical	Idealistic and universal
Influence	Influenced bureaucratic governance, military intelligence, and economic policy	Inspired moral kingship (and modern Indian ideals of dharmic rule)

Rome // src: Unsplash/Cosmin Serban

ROME (70 BCE ≈ 2,095 years ago)

Cicero’s In Verrem (Trial of Verres)

Background of the Time

To Europe then, by 70 BCE, the Roman Republic was powerful abroad but deeply unstable at home. Its political system, supposedly built on civic virtue, rotating offices, and checks on ambition was struggling under the weight of inequality, factionalism, and elite competition. Provincial administration had become a goldmine for corrupt governors. Senators were appointed to rule vast territories, collect taxes, oversee courts, and command armies. In theory, they were guardians of Roman law.

In practice, many saw provincial governorships as a chance to get rich. The provinces were distant, legal oversight weak, and local populations vulnerable. Rome’s political class often ignored abuses because they relied on the same crooked system to fund their own political careers.

Enter Gaius Verres, former governor of Sicily (73–71 BCE). His abuses became notorious even by Roman standards - extortion, bribery, the looting of temples, and rigging judicial decisions. But what truly made Verres infamous is that he was prosecuted by a rising lawyer and senator: Marcus Tullius Cicero.

Cicero’s In Verrem speeches were not just a legal case - they were a public indictment of an entire political culture that treated the provinces as private estates.

Types of Corruption and How They Manifested

Verres’ behaviour is one of the clearest ancient examples of political corruption as systemic exploitation. Cicero lays out a catalogue of abuses:

• Extortion of provincial taxpayers: Verres demanded illegal payments and manipulated grain quotas, threatening farmers with ruin if they did not comply.

• Judicial corruption: He altered court decisions for bribes, punished the innocent, and protected the wealthy and well-connected.

• Theft of public and sacred property: Verres stole artworks, statues, temple treasures, and civic funds—often under the guise of “official requisition.”

• Violence and intimidation: Roman citizens and Sicilians alike were beaten or executed for resisting his graft—violating the sacred principle that a Roman citizen should never be tortured.

• Selling public offices: He appointed local officials based on payments rather than competence.

Cicero famously argued that Verres treated Sicily “as his private hunting ground,” plundering without restraint. His corruption was not subtle; it was blatant colonial exploitation backed by Rome’s military authority.

Impact and Response

The trial of Verres was a turning point—less because Verres was uniquely corrupt, and more because Cicero used the case to expose the wider malpractice of Rome’s ruling class. Cicero understood that the real audience wasn’t the judges—it was the Roman public. His speeches framed the Verres case as a test:

• Could the Republic still hold the powerful accountable?

• Or had corruption hollowed out the system beyond repair?

The evidence was overwhelming. Verres fled into exile even before Cicero delivered the full set of speeches. But the trial’s deeper impact lay in what it revealed:

• A crisis of legitimacy: Provincial subjects began to doubt Rome’s promises of justice, eroding imperial stability.

• Judicial reform: The trial helped spark debate about whether senators should continue to control the courts, leading eventually to reforms that briefly shifted judicial power toward the equestrian class.

• Cicero’s rise: The case established Cicero as a champion of accountability and propelled him toward the consulship.

Ethically, Cicero framed corruption not simply as theft but as a betrayal of Roman identity. A true Roman magistrate was meant to embody justice, moderation, and service to the Republic. Verres, by contrast, represented greed as governance—a distortion of duty that, Cicero warned, would ultimately destroy Rome from within.

The Pantheon, Rome // src: Unsplash / Daniel Klaffke

ROME (2nd–1st century BCE ≈ 2,100 years ago)

Laws on Ambitus (electoral bribery)

Background of the Time

By the 2nd and 1st centuries BCE, the Roman Republic was a democracy in theory but an oligarchy in practice. Political careers depended on winning magistracies (offices such as quaestor, praetor, consul), and these offices were secured through annual elections. In principle, candidates were to be chosen for their virtus, dignitas, and service to the state.

In reality, elections became arms races of influence, favour-trading, and outright bribery. Rome’s elite families (the nobiles) expected enormous personal expense when running for office: hosting games, distributing grain, sponsoring public works, and privately buying votes. Politics was expensive, competitive, and often violent. The Republic was expanding rapidly, pouring wealth into the hands of ambitious families — and with wealth came temptation.

This environment produced a political culture in which ambitus - electoral corruption - became not an anomaly but the operating system. So widespread was the problem that Rome passed wave after wave of anti-ambitus laws, each attempting to curb the same behaviours the previous law had failed to stop.

Types of Corruption and How They Manifested

The Roman term ambitus covers a wide spectrum of political misconduct, nearly all of which survive in modern politics in some form:

• Direct bribery: Paying citizens, patrons, or entire tribes for their votes.

• Treating (largitiones): Providing free feasts, entertainment, and gifts specifically to influence elections.

• Electioneering networks: Using agents (divisores) to distribute bribes discreetly.

• Promise-based corruption: Offering future favours, positions, or contracts in exchange for electoral support.

• Threats and intimidation: Particularly in later periods, violence or coercion was used to sway voters.

• Mass patronage: Exploiting personal networks to create indebted blocs of supporters.

What becomes clear is that corruption in Roman elections wasn’t simply a set of bad behaviours - it was intertwined with the Republic’s entire social system of patronage, prestige, and competition. Winning office often required enormous financial outlay, creating incentives for officials to recoup their losses through provincial extortion once elected. Ambitus produced a cycle:

bribery → office → provincial exploitation → wealth → more bribery.

Impact and Response

Rome passed a series of laws to combat ambitus, including:

• Lex Baebia (181 BCE) – the earliest major anti-ambitus statute; imposed penalties on electoral bribery.

• Lex Acilia Calpurnia (67 BCE) – harsh fines and exclusion from office.

• Lex Tullia (63 BCE) – promoted by Cicero; banned treating and imposed a 10-year ban from politics for offenders.

• Lex Pompeia (52 BCE) – increased penalties amid electoral violence.

Despite these laws, corruption only worsened. Each statute was effectively an admission that the previous one had failed. As competition intensified - particularly during the rivalry between Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus - bribery and electoral violence escalated.

The deeper problem was structural:

• Winning required money.

• Money required patronage or exploitation.

• Patronage entrenched elite control.

• Elite control undermined the spirit of the Republic.

  
  

Elite families viewed political office as an investment, not a public duty. Consequently, anti-corruption laws were tools of political theatre - invoked selectively, weaponised against rivals, or ignored entirely when convenient.

Ultimately, ambitus hollowed out the Republic’s institutions. When elections became corrupted, political legitimacy eroded. When legitimacy eroded, violence took its place. By the late Republic, elections had become chaotic enough that strongmen (Sulla, Caesar, later Augustus) could present “restoration of order” as a political solution. In other words, electoral corruption helped pave the road to dictatorship.

In a pasta shell

A little different in scope to India, the difference in approach being geographical and culturally determined. In Europe, it's about what Rome did abroad - governors exploited the provinces (Verres), creating resentment and undermining imperial cohesion (imperial exploitation), and the other is about what Rome did to itself - politicians bought elections (ambitus), corrupting the Republic’s political heart (electoral corruption).

Verres used his position to extort, steal, torture, and plunder the Sicilian province. His misconduct was not unusual; what made him a symbol was Cicero’s decision to expose the rot publicly. The provincial exploitation weakened Rome’s reputation abroad, ambitus hollowed out the heart of the Republic at home. Elections became auctions of influence, bribes, “treating,” and quid-pro-quo promises. As we know, power breeds corruption and if you gained your position via bribes etc, then you're unlikely to be a just ruler. Obviously, there is a cross-over in all these sections, but the main arguments are as stated.

Aspect	In Verrem (Provincial Corruption)	Ambitus (Electoral Corruption)
Location of corruption	Provinces (e.g., Sicily)	Rome itself
Type of abuse	Extortion, theft, violence, judicial bias	Vote-buying, bribery, treating, coercion
Who benefitted?	Governors enriching themselves through imperial extraction	Elite families seeking political office and influence
Victims	Provincial subjects, local communities, Roman citizens abroad	Roman electorate, civic institutions, political fairness
Legal response	High-profile public trial by Cicero	Repeated anti-bribery laws (Lex Baebia, Lex Tullia, etc.)
Root cause	Massive discretionary power + weak oversight	Costly political competition + social acceptance of bribery
Effect on the Republic	Undermined Rome’s moral authority overseas	Undermined Rome’s political legitimacy at home
Long-term impact	Fuelled resentment, instability in the empire	Helped dismantle republican norms, paving the way to autocracy

In the End

It's not just the tech bro's and the venture capitalists that have issues with scaling, corruption was a serious internal threat to empirical rule. Of course there are numerous other factors to consider when discussing the longevity and success of empire/government. It was a different time, what if those buying their way to power were actually fulfilling their duties in line with expectations and requirements, then it was win win - remember that the Roman Empire lasted for over a thousand years - they were doing something right. They relied on law and leaders. The Mauryan Empire only lasted 137 years or so, but they left us with a few choice moral and legal learnings.

It's not surprising that corruption was present in great empires, it's expected, power corrupts and power attracts the corrupt. It is, put simply, the same old story. As with the first post in this series, it is shown that humans have the desire for order and the disposition for chaos. Even mighty and feared rulers struggle to govern their inspectors, generals and senators - more money, more problems as a talented lyricist once put it. The ebbs and flows from legalist surveillance to moral governance, and as mentioned, reforms and enforcement were dependent on the character of the ruler, maybe more so than on the permanence of the system. And not just the permanence, the size of the dominion ruled and number of regional leaders leads to yet more variables. The ideological progression depends on the particulars of dynastic inheritance and what happens during their rule - war, state-building, stabilising - the ruler vs system issue is a recurring one in anti-corruption history and rhetoric.

It's always been a complex interplay of people, power and politics. What we really see is that nothing much has changed. The laws, conventions and treaties in place now might help stop some injustice, but they are very much at the mercy of political will and the human condition. While the laws and rules created in Rome and Maurya no doubt had an impact on corruption (at varying degrees of success), it is important to note that for any government or ruling system run by humans (so far anyway), corruption is an inevitability that has to be pre-empted. The rules didn't really stop anyone then, and they don't really stop anyone now. A strict administrative apparatus, political will and legal enforcement are the keys to fighting corruption, and even then, whether led by realpolitik or moral kinship there is always someone who believes that their way is better, better for their people and themselves.

This was made by AI - I think the prompt was a simple one - visualise corruption maybe... it works.

Empires stumble and even fall due to corrupt actors, if they refuse to or are unable to confront it - omnishambles. It's not just from within, it's the calls for justice and reform from the people - pressure is required for change. Both reveal that corruption is never just about individual misconduct - it is a question of tone from the top, institutional design, political culture, and the moral or legal imagination of those who rule.

In the end, we decide what corruption is or whether it even exists - if those in power don't recognise it. It's up to Us to make the changes required. We were cold - fire helped us survive and grow. We were static - the wheel helped us move forward. We were dormant - electricity made us more than the Romans and Mauryans could imagine. Where might a corruption panacea take us. Think about what a world without corruption might look like - maybe in another 4000 years, we'll have gotten to grips with it.

Next time, I'll round up this series with a look in more recent history, bringing it into the last Millenia - Arabia, Persia, China, England, and North Africa - are some of the places we might visit. Funny that the Experiment, aka the US of A hasn't been around that long but seems to be great at showcasing the best and worst of Us...maybe that's another series though.

Thanks for reading.

Alvin

---

Sources & Disclaimers.

This article was created in collaboration with an AI research assistant.

General Inspo.

A Very Short History of Corruption.

Corruption: A Short History (The Short Histories).

INDIA

The Edicts of Ashoka

• Thapar, R. (1997). Aśoka and the Decline of the Mauryas. Oxford University Press.

• Dhammika, S. (1994). The Edicts of King Asoka: An English Rendering. Buddhist Publication Society.

• Gokhale, B. G. (1966). “The Early Indian Rulers and Their Administration.” Journal of Asian Studies, 25(2), 229–241.

• Strong, J. S. (1983). The Legend of King Aśoka: A Study and Translation of the Aśokāvadāna. Princeton University Press.

• Nikam, N. A. & McKeon, R. (trans.) (1959). The Edicts of Asoka. University of Chicago Press.

Kautilya’s Arthashastra 

• Kautilya (trans. Shamasastry, R.) (1915). Arthashastra. Government Press, Bangalore.

• Boesche, R. (2002). “Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy.” Journal of Military History, 66(1), 9–37.

• Trautmann, T. R. (1971). Kautilya and the Arthashastra: A Statistical Investigation of the Authorship and Evolution of the Text. Brill.

• Rangarajan, L. N. (1992). Kautilya: The Arthashastra. Penguin Books India.

• Olivelle, P. (2013). King, Governance, and Law in Ancient India: Kautilya’s Arthashastra. Oxford University Press.

ITALY

In Verrem

• Cicero, In Verrem. Loeb Classical Library Edition.https://www.loebclassics.com/view/cicero-orations_i_verrem/1928/pb_LCL221.3.xml

• Steel, C. (2004). Cicero, Rhetoric and Empire. Oxford University Press.https://global.oup.com/academic/product/cicero-rhetoric-and-empire-9780199248476

• Gruen, E. (1984). The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome. University of California Press.https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft2g5004sk

• Lintott, A. (1999). The Constitution of the Roman Republic. Oxford University Press.https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-constitution-of-the-roman-republic-9780199261086

Ambitus

• Lintott, A. (1999). The Constitution of the Roman Republic. Oxford University Press.https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-constitution-of-the-roman-republic-9780199261086

• Yakobson, A. (1999). Elections and Electioneering in Rome. Franz Steiner Verlag.https://www.steiner-verlag.de/elections-and-electioneering-in-rome-9783515075152

• Gruen, E. S. (1974). The Last Generation of the Roman Republic. University of California Press.https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft3q2nb2gw

• Cicero. Pro Murena (speech defending a politician accused under the Lex Tullia). Loeb Classical Library.https://www.loebclassics.com/view/marcus_tullius_cicero-pro_murena/1918/pb_LCL197.3.xml